Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1 PhD student at philosophy of religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies. Tehran University.
2 Professor at department of philosophy of religion, faculty of theology and Islamic studies, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran
3 Assistant professor at at department of philosophy of religion, faculty of theology and Islamic studies, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
The contradiction between divine “omnipotence” and “omnibenevolence” is a major debate in philosophy of religion studies. Based on divine omnibenevolence, it is said that “he cannot do immoral actions”. On the surface, at least, this doctrine appears to be in conflict with the doctrine of divine omnipotence. An omnipotent being is one that can do all things possible; and, surely, it is possible to do immoral action. Nelson Pike discusses this matter in detail. He suggests as to how the various senses of “God cannot do moral actions” ought to be sorted out. Based on Pike’s suggestion, although the individual that is God has the ability to do immoral actions, His nature or character is such as to provide assurance that He will not act in this way. Joshua Hoffman maintains that Pike’s strategy for resolving the dilemma fails because it commits him to God’s being contingently omnibenevolent (not necessarily). In response, Pike accepts that God is not necessarily omnibenevolent and it’s the only way to resolve the dilemma. In Pike’s defense, the discrimination between “logical necessity” and “metaphysical necessity” should be noted. Further, we should distinguish between “the title of God” and “the individual of God”. “The title of God is benevolent” is metaphysically necessary while “The individual of God is contingently benevolent”. Therefore “God is necessarily benevolent” based on His title but this necessity doesn’t result in any limit for divine omnipotence.
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