Document Type : Original Article

Authors

• Hossein tosi ¹
• reza akbari ²

¹ PhD student in Theology, Philosophy of Religion and New Theological Issues, Islamic Azad University, Isfahan Branch

² Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, Islamic Studies and Guidance, Imam Sadegh University

Abstract

William Wainwright believes that mystical experience has the same structure as sense experience and thus tries to prove the cognitive validity of this experience based on the similarity between the two experiences and the principle of credulity. This kind of argument can also be found in different expressions in the works of philosophers such as Swinburne and Alston. However, it seems that neither one is not able to argue for the cognitivity of mystical experience based on the similarity between the two experiences, nor it can be defended certainly as being cognitive. While they do have some similarities, there are considerable differences between mystical experience and sense experience which makes their comparison more difficult. Furthermore, since credulity principle is not regarded as a definite principle in religious epistemology, the use of this principle to prove the cognitivity of mystical experience could be a drawback of the argument.

Keywords

• William Wainwright
• mystical experience
• sense experience
• cognitive experiences
• principle of credulity