Mohammad Mahdi Fallah; Ali Asghar Mosleh
Volume 11, Issue 2 , December 2023, , Pages 169-202
Abstract
Introduction
The etymology of nihilism suggests that all its various meanings invariably refer to "Nothingness," thereby different conceptions of "Nothingness" can shape our encounter with nihilism. Within al-Ḥekmat al-Muta’āliyah, notions of "Nothingness" (‘Adam) are proposed to contribute ...
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Introduction
The etymology of nihilism suggests that all its various meanings invariably refer to "Nothingness," thereby different conceptions of "Nothingness" can shape our encounter with nihilism. Within al-Ḥekmat al-Muta’āliyah, notions of "Nothingness" (‘Adam) are proposed to contribute to existing literature and offer pathways for engaging with nihilism. Thus, this article probes whether the conceptual framework of al-Ḥekmat al-Mutaʿāliyah can indeed yield possibilites for confronting nihilism. The claim put forth here is that despite the extensive scrutiny al-Ḥekmat al-Muta’āliyah has undergone, there are no implicit possibility within it for articulating "Nothingness". Instead, this article argues that by highlighting certain reflections brought about by comparative philosophers, al-Ḥekmat al-Muta’āliyah might offer interpretative possibilities in facing nihilism.
Theoretical Basis
Before Heidegger, nihilism was predominantly seen as a historical quandary. While Nietzsche touched on a philosophical confrontation with nihilism, his focus on "European Nihilism" somewhat limited the scope of his analysis geographically. However, with Heidegger, the notion of "Nothingness" in connection to the question of Being was deemed necessary for encountering nihilism. He asserted that varied conceptions of Nothingness could lead to a Verwindung of nihilism, rather than a Überwindung, which he deemed neither feasible nor desirable. Heidegger noted resemblances between his reflections and those emerging in Eastern Asia. This article explores this relationship with al-Ḥekmat al-Mutaʿāliyah and examines the potential it holds for encountering nihilism.
Results
This article demonstrates that al-Ḥekmat al-Mutaʿāliyah addresses 'Adam through at least four categories: (1) the conception of 'Adam; (2) Hylomorphism (Hayolāye Āvvalī); (3) motion and stillness (Ḥarekat wa Sukun); and (4) "aggregated nothingness" (‘Adam Mojāme‘). The prevailing view among members of al-Ḥekmat al-Muta’āliyah is that Nothingness is contingent upon Being and can only be understood within the context of Being. Consequently, Nothingness is neither a tangible entity nor a phenomenon that can manifest in reality; thus, it cannot possess any attributes, with some even arguing it is inconceivable. As a result, all conceptions of Nothingness within al-Ḥekmat al-Muta’āliyah are metonymical, and a true discourse on Nothingness remains elusive. Despite this, the issue, configured as the paradox of absolute nothingness, has elicited responses within al-Ḥekmat al-Muta’āliyah, yet none of these responses adequately address the challenge of encountering nihilism. Nonetheless, some comparative philosophers, such as Henry Corbin and Toshihiko Izutsu, have underscored concepts within al-Ḥekmat al-Muta’āliyah that aid in grasping Nothingness, such as "Non-Conditional as the Source of Division" (lā-be-Šarṭ Maqsamī), which Izutsu likened to the "no (no not-being)" of Zhuangzi and identified with the concept of "Nothingness" in Eastern wisdom. This notion has been further expounded upon in the works of Dāryush Šāyegan and Qāsem Kākāī. Consequently, akin to how Nishitani Keiji considered "Śūnyatā" a tool for engaging with nihilism, it can be posited that lā-be-Šarṭ Maqsamī is the contribution al-Ḥekmat al-Mutaʿāliyah makes to the existing discourse.
Conclusions
In conclusion, al-Ḥekmat al-Mutaʿāliyah can partially contribute to the confrontation with nihilism and offer possibilities for a Verwindung. These potentials are attained by a critical examination of al-Ḥekmat al-Mutaʿāliyah, along with a recognition of its boundaries, while augmenting it with insights gleaned from comparative studies within the discipline. The concept of lā-be-Šarṭ Maqsamī can be interpreted in this context, suggesting that absolute nothingness might be conceived as a plenitude akin to absolute being, rather than solely as void. Through this approach, avenues can open up to confront nihilism in al-Ḥekmat al-Mutaʿāliyah.
Amirabbas Soulikhani; Qodratullah Qorbani
Volume 10, Issue 2 , March 2022, , Pages 21-42
Abstract
Questions like: "Is There a God?" and "Does God give meaning to life?" are two of the most vivid philosophical questions and Nietzsche reflected on both of them. Nietzsche denies the objective existence of God on the basis of a version of the divine hiddenness argument. He maintains that if one accepts ...
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Questions like: "Is There a God?" and "Does God give meaning to life?" are two of the most vivid philosophical questions and Nietzsche reflected on both of them. Nietzsche denies the objective existence of God on the basis of a version of the divine hiddenness argument. He maintains that if one accepts the theistic conception of God then he won’t be able to explain the silence of God throughout the history. He then thinks about the dying role of believing in God in giving meaning to human life. By using allegorical characters such as the madman with lantern, the old saint, the retired pope and the ugliest human being, Nietzsche tries to show how the death of God will result in spiritual crisis. The doctrine of Übermensch fills the emptiness that emerges after the death of God but Nietzsche’s argument against the existence of God is not successful and cannot establish an atheistic ontology. In addition to that, despite of some examples in different religions, there isn’t any necessary relation between believing in God with the Resentment and the denial of life. Finally, it will be shown that the doctrine of Übermensch is such an unachievable goal that will lead to human's psychological dissatisfaction.
