بررسی نقادانۀ خداباوری شکاکانۀ برگمن و بن‌بست شکاکیت اخلاقی

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکترای فلسفه دین دانشگاه تهران

2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه دین دانشگاه تهران

چکیده

خداباوری شکاکانه یکی از انواع پاسخ‌های فیلسوفان خداباور در واکنش به مسئلۀ قرینه‌ای شر است. این رویکرد که خود دربردارندۀ مجموعه‌ای از آراست، با تکیه بر محدودیت قوای شناختی بشر و پیچیدگی و ژرفای واقعیت ارزشی، در ادعای گزاف‌بودن شرور تردید می‌افکند. این مقاله مبتنی بر آرای برگمن، از فیلسوفان برجستۀ این حوزه، است. برگمن با مطرح‌کردن فرض‌های شکاکانۀ خود که مبتنی بر اصل «نمونة بارز» هستند، می‌کوشد تا استدلال ویلیام رو را به‌ چالش بکشد. مقالات برگمن در این حوزه، تأثیرگذار و به‌شدت بحث‌برانگیز شدند. یکی از نقدهایی که به آرای او شده است، قرارگرفتن خداباوری شکاکانه در بن‌بستی اخلاقی است. منتقدان بر این باورند که این رویکرد هم از جنبۀ نظری اخلاق (توجیه اخلاقی) به بن‌بست می‌رسد، و هم از جنبۀ عملی اخلاق؛ از نظر آنان این موضع دقیقاً مخالف رویکرد ما در اخلاق روزمره است و به‌هیچ‌وجه مطلوب و پذیرفتنی نیست، لذا خداباوری شکاکانه پذیرفتنی نیست. برگمن درمقابل، گرچه محدودیت در حوزۀ ارزش‌ها را می‌پذیرد، آن را مانعی برای فعل اخلاقی نمی‌داند. این مقاله می‌کوشد ابتدا موضع برگمن را روشن کند، آن‌گاه به تقریر نقدهای واردشده و پاسخ‌های مطرح‌شده بپردازد. درنهایت روشن می‌‌شود با تکیه بر وظیفه‌گرایی اخلاقی و تاکید بر جایگاه اخلاقی متفاوت انسان و خداوند می‌توان از بن‌بست شکاکیت اخلاقی رهایی جست.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Critical Consideration of Bergmann’s Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism Impasse

نویسندگان [English]

  • Fateme Saeedi 1
  • abdolrasul kashfi 2
  • amir abbas alizamani 2
1 Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran
2 Associate Professor of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Tehran
چکیده [English]

Skeptical theism is one of the theistic responses to the evidential problem of evil. This approach which is included of different ideas, with emphasizing on human cognitive limitations and complicated axiological reality, casts doubt on the claim of gratuitous evil. This article is based on Bergmann’s idea, who is one of the prominent philosopher in this sphere. He challenges William Rowe’s inductive argument with his skeptical theses which are based on “representative” principle. Bergmann’s articles in this sphere are influential and highly controversial. One of the main objections to his idea is that his skeptical theses lead to moral impasse, both in theoretical (moral justification) and pragmatic aspect. This is against our approach in our everyday moral life. Since this position is not acceptable in everyday moral life, skeptical theism is not acceptable either. Although Bergmann accepts limitations in sphere of value, he doesn’t think it makes problem for skeptical theism. This article first introduce representative approach of Bergmann then considering objections and responses to them. At least it becomes clear that Bergmann’s solutions does not response objections rightly.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Skeptical theism
  • Bergmann
  • representative sample
  • skeptical theses
  • moral skepticism
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