عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]چکیده [English]
John Hick is renowned celebrated for his endeavors to explain religious plurality and diversity. Up front, He strives to set forth an explanatory hypothesis that can portray the best explanation of this pluralism in the real world, adopting miscellaneous philo-epistemological elements. Hick, although ontologically accepts the ultimate reality independent of mind and language (in a critical realism framework), does not maintain that realism has only ontological aspect but it also has epistemo-semantic dimensions. So there is a far long way for him to traverse.
Analyzing his pluralistic standpoint to explain religious experience and its related epistemology, the author’s main objective is to shed some lights on the fact that Hick’s view yields some kind of ontological anti-realism while adopting Fregean-Russelian descriptive theory of reference. Through pointing out Hick’s explicit and implicit pre-suppositions of his theory of reference, the author calls into question the reference theory and the possibility of being bound to these requirements from Hick’s viewpoint. The question is whether or not the, adopted by Hick concerning religious reality, leads him to a view compatible with his realistic standpoint